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THE HARDSHIPS AND INCONVENIENCES:
Manatee River Forts during the Seminole Wars
Dr. Joe Knetsch
Descriptions of the land in Florida found in
the promotional brochures of the mid to late
nineteenth century tell of a new Riviera or
"The Italy of America" or some other such
romantic vision. One would hardly suspect
that the vision presented in these fanciful
writings of the early advertisers would
somehow be a misrepresentation of the
truth. Convincingly, they often told of a
verdant land being exposed for the first time
to the pulse of civilization and capable of
growing any number of exotic tropical fruits
which would readily find a market in the
thriving industrial towns of the northern
cities. It would be very apparent to anyone
who came to this new Canaan that the land
was very well worth fighting for and the
Seminoles, notorious murderers and lazy
savages, had every reason to attempt to
prevent the progressive forces of Anglo
civilization from seizing this Eden and
making it their own. Indeed, why let any
group of uncouth Indians prevent the
settlement of this new land by those wishing
to plant oranges, enjoy walks on the beaches
and generally bring culture to the wilderness
Those who served the forces of "civilization" in places like Forts Armstrong,
Myakka, Starke, Crawford, Hamer or Camp
Smead found that romance was far from the
reality of the frontier. Life was difficult,
tenuous and often short. A raid by hostile
Indians could bring instant death, loss of
property and life savings or the end of a
dream. The reality of intolerable insects,
dangerous reptiles, crowded conditions,
constant fear and an unpredictable nature
made life in these outposts almost

The

insufferable
to
those
forced
by
circumstances to endure these hardships.
The constant demands for food, water and
fuel meant a daily exposure to possible
death. The often overcrowded area meant
short tempers, instant rivalries and the threat
of violence, domestic or otherwise. Culture
and civilization were far from the reality of
these outposts of defense.
As those who have read Janet Snyder
Matthews’ Edge of Wilderness or heard
Dewey Dye, Jr. back in January of 1967
know, there was only one "permanent" fortification on the Manatee River during the
Second Seminole War, it was called Fort
Starke and was situated near the mouth of
the Manatee River. It was established on
November 25, 1840, and abandoned on
January 5, 1841.1 This fort served as a
jumping off point for expeditions up the
Manatee River and its tributaries. Dewey
Dye, Jr. reports that the Post Returns for this
installation indicate that it was manned by
officers and men from the U. S. Army First
Infantry, headquartered at Fort Armistead on
Sarasota Bay, and commanded by Captain
A. S. Miller. Companies B, E and F
comprised the garrison and totaled about
140 men. Dye also speculates that no actual
construction of a fortification took place and
that the position was simply referred to as a
"post", indicating no permanent buildings.2
The river had been visited many times by
the military prior to the establishment of this
post.
One of the first such scouts took place on
March 18, 1836, very early in the Second
Seminole War. The expedition from the U.
S. Ship Vandalia produced no results and

the report of the territory along the river is
bereft of information describing the physical
nature of the area.3 The only indication of
the topography is found in the following:
"In conformity with your orders of the 16
inst., directing me to reconnoitre an Indian
encampment in the neighborhood of the
Manatee river etc., I have to inform you that
I landed the same evening, within one and a
half miles of the spot where the Indians were
supposed to be encamped. Our forces
amounted to twenty five men including Lt.
Smith from your ship, Doctor Rassler and
the Seamen from the Vandalia, it was nearly
dark before we arrived on the spot where
Mr. Johnson saw the Camp the day before,
we strictly examined the ground and the
adjacent wood, but could not discover either
Indian or Cattle, but we saw evident
indications of a recent encampment, such as
prints of Indian feet, tracks of Cattle, etc.
We remained in the wood until seven in the
evening, at 8 we arrived on board. Yesterday
morning we again landed our whole force
and commenced our march into the wood,
taking a Southerly direction, after passing
the ground that we visited the day before,
we fell in with Indian and Cattle trails of
recent date, all of which evidently tending in
the direction of Sarazotta having an Indian
guide with us we concluded to march on,
and did so until we found ourselves ten
miles in the interior of the wood. Men and
Officers being completely jaded down,
deemed it prudent to commence our retreat
on the cutter. We arrived on board at 6
P.M."4
The march brought the command through
woods on the southern bank of the river,
however, because the exact location is not
known, it would be nearly impossible to
pin-point the spot today. The ground covered must have been soft and the going
slow, because the normal distance covered

by an army command in that day was anywhere from twelve to sixteen miles.
However, the only true notation seen is that
they went south through woods and no
species is identified.
Although not the only reconnaissance of the
Manatee River area during the war, it is one
of the more complete reports found to date.
The major reason that fewer scouts were
sent via the Manatee is that the Indians were
farther away from that area than any other in
South Florida. If one reviews the
correspondence, it is easily seen that the
highest concentrations of the Seminoles and
their allies were in the Big Cypress, around
Lake Okeechobee, near the coontie grounds
on the southeast coast and along the
Kissimmee River. None of these positions is
accessible by taking the Manatee River or
any of its tributaries. This leads to the
question, why establish Fort Starke so late in
the war in an area not frequented by the
Indians or their allies
It can be seen from the report of November
24, 1840, that a concern of the army was the
gathering of Indians along the islands of the
coast. This short report simply noted that:
"The 1st Regt. is scouting along the Gulf
shore below Tampa with boats accompanied
by a steamer and two schooners."5 Four days
later, the 1st Infantry arrived at Fort Starke:
"B, E, & F companies 1st Infty arrived here
this morning, bad weather having delayed
them. The Boat did not arrive at Fort
Armistead until 24th inst. & was dispatched
the next morning." read the official
notification from Major Dearborn. The
Major then continued his report: "I
reconoitered the country from Ft. Armistead
some ten or a dozen miles on my first
arrival, and since the last rain. The country
was wet on my first excursions, and is now
mostly over-flowed. One of the Indians who
accompanied me as a guide says that we will

be obliged to swim two creeks with our
horses on the trail leading to Peace Creek,
and so far as I went the water was half-leg
deep most of the way, and a very blind trail
that the Indian was unable to follow."6 The
watery way from anywhere to Fort Stark and
the remainder of the territory made life
difficult and lead to charges that the area
may have been unhealthy, or "miasmatic" in
the language of the day. However, the real
reason for the fort’s founding is found
shortly thereafter in a letter of December 11,
1840: "It is the direction of the Commanding
General that during the present cessation of
operations in your district, a detachment
under a competent officer be employed to
stake out the inner passage leading to Fort
Armistead, and any other channels which it
may be deemed expedient to indicate in that
manner. From their superior durability cedar
stakes should be employed, if practicable."7
Thus, the only reason for the founding of
Fort Starke is the protection and scouting
out of a route via an "inner" passage from
Tampa Bay to Fort Armistead, on Sarasota
Bay. This passage being established and
staked out, the fort was soon disbanded.
The navigability of the Manatee River made
any form of reinforcement in the area
relatively easy. This was early recognized
by everyone and may be the reason Indians
did not establish themselves on the river
after the occupation of Tampa Bay by the
United States Army at Fort Brook. The early
settlers of the area certainly noted the ease
of communication available via the river and
almost everyone of those who settled under
the Armed Occupation Act of 1842, chose
sites on or near the river’s banks. The
success of the early settlers depended greatly
upon the ease of shipment and receiving of
goods and materials. That the area attracted
the such capable leaders and plantation men
as the Gambles, Gates and Bradens is ample
indication of this ease of communication.

The almost constant threat of Indian attack
made the Manatee frontier highly
susceptible to rumor of same and led to
much correspondence between the settlement and Tampa Bay, the regional headquarters for the army. Through most of the
year 1846, these communications were carried on with the colony’s leader, Sam Reid.8
His passing in 1847 meant the leadership
fell upon the capable shoulders of Josiah
Gates and Robert Gamble. These men, along
with Joseph Braden, carried on communication with the major State and army
leaders in Tallahassee and Tampa. Yet,
some of these very same leaders, like
Senator James D. Westcott, also kept the
tension at a near fever pitch with their
questioning of the army’s representatives in
the area.9 Trader John Darling, then at
Charlotte Harbor and later at Payne’s Creek,
also brought doubt on the army’s judgement,
directly attacking the personal motives of
Indian Agent John Casey.10 By 1849,
enough of this type of material and rumor
had spread that suspicions were running
high.
In that year, two incidents, well known and
discussed by Dr. James Covington and
others, took place at Indian River and
Payne’s Creek which set the whole country
on fire with war fever.11 The incident, which
cost the lives of Captain Payne and others
brought about a nearly full-fledged Indian
war on the frontier. Only quick response by
Billy Bowlegs, agent Casey and others
prevented the final eruption at that time. On
the Manatee frontier, the scare led to the
establishment of Camp Manatee, Forts
Myakka, Crawford and, most importantly,
Hamer. The Post Returns from all of these
encampments indicate that Fort Hamer was
the nerve center for response to this crisis.
Mail for all of these places was delivered to
Hamer for distribution, Court Martials were
held there and when the two remaining

posts, Crawford and Myakka, were
abandoned, their companies were sent to
Hamer.12 When the army left Fort Hamer, in
October of 1850, the stage was set for the
next move in the game to remove the
Seminoles from Florida, namely the petition
drive and public meetings requesting State
action.
Fort Hamer, always an object of interest to
Manatee citizens, has not been precisely
located by proper archaeological and historical research, at this time. Many claim to
know the exact location, and they may be
very correct. However, for our purpose, the
situation of the fort being approximately
fifteen miles west of Fort Crawford, on the
south bank of the river and about ten miles
up river, near the head of steamboat
navigation, will suffice.13 What exactly did
this outpost look like and what were the
conditions under which men and women
lived in or near this forth Dewey Dye, Jr.
reports finding Lieutenant Hayes’ report to
the Quartermaster General in which the
following description is found:
". . . a hospital building had been completed
(by April 1850), 60 feet by 25 feet,
’containing three airy wards with ceilings 11
feet high.’ He reported that porches extended
the whole length of the hospital building, in
front and rear. Ends of the front porch had
been enclosed to make two shed rooms, one
a dispensary and the other, the store room.
He also reported he had completed a hay
house that had been erected to the
dimensions 80 feet by 21 feet, height 15
feet. He also reported that three sheds had
been completed and it looks like a ram of
log
houses
under
construction
to
accommodate a garrison of three companies
. . . He also reported [says Dye] that the
beams, rafters and heavy timbers were cut
from the nearby pine woods."14

How does this compare to other forts constructed in Florida during the Seminole
Wars The buildings at Fort Pierce were
reported as being an officers quarters measuring 124 feet by 18 feet covered with
boards, three log enclosures covered by tarpaulin which measured 30 feet by 15 feet
each and a hospital which occupied a space
28 feet by 16 feet. The area was generally
open, no walls, and had only one blockhouse
upon which stood the artillery pieces) and
some rough-hewn pickets, loosely spaced.15
Fort Drane, one of the main fortifications at
the beginning of the Second Seminole War,
simply took the existing buildings of
General Duncan Clinch’s plantation,
surrounded them with a "picketification"
and used the main buildings, redbugs, fleas
and all, for the officers and troops.16
Historian Albert Manucy has described the
construction of fortifications used in Florida
in the following manner:
"To build such a fort, you simply obtain a
few hundred trees, cut them in 18foot
lengths, and split them up the middle. Then
you set them into the ground side by side
like a fence, fasten them together with
timbers, cut loopholes eight feet from the
ground and build firing steps under the
loopholes for the riflemen. Outside you dig a
ditch that served as a kind of moat. You
hung a strong gate, and your fort is
practically finished."17
Michael Schene, whose work on Fort Foster
is well known by Florida historians, also
noted the large need for trees used by the
construction of forts similar to those
described by Manucy. He added that the
long poles were split, sharpened to a point
and placed into the ground so that ten to
fourteen feet were left above the level of the
surrounding turf.18 Arthur Franke, in his
work on Fort Mellon, described the fortress
as having a three storied blockhouse in the

center surrounded by and enclosure.19 As
seen on any map of the forts during these
wars, the most common plan, and it became
the symbol for a fortification, was a
rectangular or square structure with two
blockhouses at opposite corners. Not surprisingly, none of these types describe
exactly what Fort Hamer must have looked
like as detailed by Lieutenant Hayes.
It has long been a popular misconception
that all forts basically looked the same and
provided the same protection. As can be
seen from the above, this is definitely not
the case in Florida. From the open air style
found at Fort Pierce to the tight,
blockhouse-enclosure type of Fort Mellon,
Florida’s fortification differed widely.
Perhaps the greatest reason for this diversity
is the availability of useable wood. In areas
where pine and hardwood are plentiful, the
enclosure type of fortification was used,
whereas in neighborhoods where such wood
was scarce or expensive to procure, the more
open style was adopted. This would help to
explain the rich variations found in Florida
fort construction.
Life for those living at the fort may have
been a bit dull and routine, once the pattern
had been set. Troops were constantly on
rotation scouting the territory for possible
Indian signs and keeping whites from the
designated "Indian Boundary". If the post
were to be permanent, there would have
been regular gardening to attend to, as, by an
1819 law, permanent military installations
were required to have a garden to provide
vegetables and grains for the troops.
However, as Fort Hamer was not regarded
as a permanent post, this probably did not
happen. Which meant that subsistence for
the troops and those dependent on them had
to be shipped into the area and stored, which
was probably the purpose of the large "hay
building" constructed by Lieutenant Hayes.

It is notable that the location of the fort, as
noted by Ms. Matthews in her book, was at
the head of steamboat navigation for the
river. This reinforces the conclusion that the
materials were shipped in and stored at Fort
Hamer, which then distributed the materials
and rations needed to Forts Crawford and
Myakka. Shipping rations and materials to
other posts meant that the army, most likely,
had to construct the roads to these outposts.
It is significant that George Cordon Meade,
the leader of Union troops at Gettysburg,
when constructing his maps of southern
Florida in 1850-51 noted that the road from
Fort Crawford to Fort Myakka, a distance of
between 16 and 17 miles, was a "good road"
while that headed east from Fort Crawford
needed a lot of work to make it usable.20
Road duty, like gardening, was part of the
required work routine found at most military
posts.
One of the major reasons for the location of
Fort Hamer, as just noted, was its position at
the head of steamboat navigation. It must be
noted, regardless of the fertility of Manatee’s
fabled lands, that forage and food were very
expensive in Florida and that it was cheaper
to have it shipped to the military posts from
places such as Baltimore, Philadelphia and
elsewhere. During the Second Seminole
War, for example, one consignment to
Florida was described as follows:
"I herewith transmit a statement showing the
quantity of Forage shipped to several depots
in Florida since the 26th ultimo. Captain
Crossman reports that he is now loading a
vessel with Hay at Boston destined for
Tampa which will carry 700 bales, and one
for Savannah which will carry 800. Captain
Tompkins is loading a vessel at Philadelphia
with Forage which will carry from six to
seven hundred bales of hay and 6 to 8
thousand bushels of grain. Captain
Dusenbery has taken up a vessel for the

same depot which will carry about 7000
bushels of grain and will sail in a few days;
and Captain Hetzel is now loading a vessel
at Alexandria for Saint Marks which will
carry about 8000 Bushels of grain and is
expected to sail on the 12th instant."21
These large quantities of forage and grain
indicate some of the problems of supplying
troops for campaigns in Florida. The major
reason for these shipments is the relatively
undeveloped state of agriculture in the state
in the 1840s and 1850s. The concentration
on cotton in the northern tier of counties and
the disorganized state of affairs in the
southern portion caused by the wars, or
threats of war, made these types of shipments a necessity.
The forts also provided medical treatment,
such as it was, to the surrounding
population. Although this was not the recommended way to get medical attention and
the army did not encourage the practice, it
was fairly common to have the post surgeon
look at the local populace when time and
facilities warranted it. One of the reasons for
this was to check this group for possible
communicable diseases which may infect
the fighting force. The rate of sickness at
many of the posts in Florida was the major
factor in closing most of the installations
during the so-called "sickly season", i.e. the
rainy season. Fort Hamer was served by an
"Assistant Surgeon", the title given to
doctors who did not have enough time in the
army to rise to the rank of surgeon, which
Dr. William Strait, who has written
extensively on medical history in the
Sunshine State, informs me, could take as
many as ten to fifteen years. Thus, when
Assistant Surgeon Sloan replaced Assistant
Surgeon Ballard on March 24, 1850, this did
not mean that the post, and surrounding
population, received less competent medical

attention than a station with a full-fledged
surgeon.22
One of the major problems on the frontier
posts was that caused by alcohol. Not only
did the troops have to guard against
unscrupulous whites illegally selling liquor
to the Indians, but they had to also attempt
to control the sale of same to their colleagues. Most everyone has read or heard of
the problems suffered by U. S. Grant while
stationed on the isolated California frontier,
yet the same problems occurred many times
in Florida. Although I have found no
specific references to Fort Hamer or the
other Manatee posts, one can assume that
the problem was evident here as elsewhere.
During the preceding war, Fort Micanopy
had a severe problem with local grog shops,
run by former soldiers.23 In the rather unique
journal of Bartholomew M. Lynch, edited as
the "Squaw Kissing War", this literate
common soldier tells numerous tales of
officers, under the influence, beating recruits
for no reason and constantly covering up for
each other.24 At Fort Stansbury, outside of
Tallahassee, in 1843, Lt. Colonel Ethan
Allen Hitchcock, then of the 3rd Infantry,
noted the reasons for asking the discharge of
twenty-eight men of his command. His
reasons included: "habitual drunkard",
"intemperate and uncleanly in his habits",
"An incorrigable Drunkard", "A common
Drunkard, broken down in health and from
that cause", and "Drunkenness and bad
conduct, being one of the greatest smugglers
of whiskey extant."25 These incidents of the
life of a frontier outpost give ample example
of the problems created by alcohol and the
boredom of post routine.
Violence to persons, too, was found in every
post on the frontier of Florida. It is
inconceivable that the Manatee forts escaped
this plague. Hitchcock noted that one of the
reasons for his dismissal of one of his troops

was, "for the murder of a fellow soldier".26
Lieutenant Colonel William Whistler
reported that, in January of 1842, "Sir,
Private James Steck of C Compy 7th Infty
murdered his wife on the 11th Inst. for
which crime he has been turned over to the
civil authority." For such a crime, he continued, "I have to request that he be discharged [from] the service."27 The almost
constant threat of violence between regular
troops and the local militia forces has been
well documented by James M. Denham and
needs no further comment here.28
However, more pleasant past-times also
found their way into the life enjoyed by the
frontier soldiers and local inhabitants.
Fishing in the river seems to have been
universal wherever in Florida a post was
established near water. Hunting in the
woods, too, was enjoyed by many, although
sometimes with additional adventure.
George Ballentine recorded the following in
his memoirs:
"Having so much spare time on hand, our
men frequently took long rambles in the
woods, especially during the fine dry
weather; and on these ocassions, for some
time after our arrival in Tampa Bay, there
was a danger of getting so utterly lost in the
woods, as not to be able to find the way
home; thus incurring the serious risk of
dying of starvation. An occurrence of this
description happened shortly after our
arrival . . . A young man belonging to our
company had gone out shoot one day, by
himself, and in his eagerness for the sport he
had gone a considerable distance away from
the path, without having paid sufficient
attention to the direction in which it lay, to
be able to find it again . . . . After a few
hours search, he was discovered about six
miles from the garrison, and within a mile
from the footpath. He was very nearly
exhausted when found by the party, and but
for measures taken by the lieutenant, it is

probable that he would have soon died of
sheer hunger and fatigue . . . "29
These instances are well known and documented by many of the soldiers who left
memoirs and letters, e.g. George McCall and
Alexander Webb, and need no further
elucidation.
The area of the Manatee River presented
many opportunities such as those described
above, however, as soon as the Scare of
1849 was over, the attention of the citizens
returned to the ever present "danger" of a
serious outbreak of hostilities. This was not
long in coming with, in late 1855, the attack
on Lieutenant Hartsuff’s command in the
famed banana patch of Billy Bowlegs. Once
again the call came for the establishments of
fortifications along the Manatee River. In
early 1856, Hamlin V Snell’s home was
burned: "We have reliable information direct
from Tampa," the Alligator Advertiser
reported on March 13th, "that in the early
part of last week, twelve Indian warriors
attacked the premises of Hon. H. V. Snell at
Sarasota, about sixty miles south of Tampa,
and nine miles from the Manatee settlement.
A man named Cunningham was in the house
at the time the attack was made, and was
killed; a negro man preparing dinner in the
kitchen made his escape. Mr. Snell
happened to be out, at the time, and upon
discovering the smoke of his burning
residence, fled to Manatee."30 Shortly
thereafter, the home of Asa Goddard,
located near the headwaters of the Manatee,
and within two miles of "Capt. Addison’s
fort", was plundered and burned. The John
Craig home, nearly one-half mile away was
also robbed of its remaining contents.31 Less
than a year later, Captain Clarke, of the 4th
Artillery, found signs of fresh inhabitation
on an island at the mouth of the Little
Manatee River and again sent out the
alarm.32 The war was again active on the

Manatee frontier and the call for protection
came fast and loud. The result was the
establishment of Fort Armstrong, Camp
Smead, on the 2nd of September in 1856.33
Most of the Manatee settlers appear to have
scrambled for the protection of the post(s).
When the army threatened to leave the area,
for lack of Indian signs, William H. Johnson
took pen in hand and wrote to Washington
to protest. "If all the troops are withdrawn
from here," he noted, "the whole frontier
from the Gulf to the Atlantic will be
sacrificed beyond a doubt, all the settlers
here have gathered together at different
Posts along the frontier, have been away
from their homes since January 1856,
believing that the Government would move
with energy against the Indians, and that
they would all be permitted soon to return to
their homes, but now after enduring all the
hardships and inconveniences of a Camp life
for Sixteen months we are told that all the
troops are to be withdrawn, and we the poor
sufferers to take the best care of ourselves
that we can." He went on to encourage the
government to allow the volunteers to
remain on duty to protect the settlements
until "Maj. Blake tries his experiment with
Billy Bowlegs", which he doubted would
succeed.34
Not all of the Manatee settlers agreed with
Johnson’s assessment of the situation and
also took their pens in hand to counter his
opinions.
"The undersigned having been informed that
the residents at the settlement on the
Manatee River are petitioning for a guard of
Regular Soldiers to be stationed at that
place, beg leave to state (1) That nearly, if
not quite all of the said residents; are now
paid by the United States for protecting
themselves at home & have their horses fed
also, (2) That we do not believe that there is

the least apprehension of any danger from
Indians on any part of said River, (3) That
we are residing on much more exposed
situations on, or near, said River, having no
neighbors near as some having families, two
having stores with goods & owning land &
negroes, & hitherto no guard has been
furnished us, Nor do we now consider any
necessary, But if Regulars are to be sent to
this River, we ask that a fair proportion of
them be stationed with us in order that we
may derive a fair proportion of the profits to
be made out of them, as they can be of no
other use on the River."35
This letter was signed by Joseph Atzroth and
others residing at the mouth of the river at
what he sarcastically called "Fort Atzroth".
The fact is, Atzroth may have been closer to
the truth of the matter than is generally
accepted, because, most of the action was
taking place in the Everglades and along the
Peace River frontier, not near the settled
areas of the Manatee, at least after the
beginning of 1856. This debate may warrant
more investigation.
The land of the Manatee River attracted
many during the 1840s and 1850s despite
the trouble with the Seminoles. 2nd
Lieutenant F. M. Follett, 4th Artillery,
described the land he saw at the time as he
scouted the lands of Manatee in early 1857
as mostly pine barren with an undergrowth
of saw palmetto and an occasional sawgrass
pond. He mentioned only two hammocks of
hardwood and notes that they were not of
great extent, the largest being only one
thousand yards across. The description is
one of rather plain land, monotonous to a
point.36 Yet this land attracted some of the
most important men in Florida during the
Territorial period and continued, under Snell
and Gates, to provide the leadership for
southern Florida into the days prior to the
outbreak of the War Between the States.

What the army missed in its reports was the
obvious fertility and potential of the area for
crops like sugar, tobacco and citrus.
Although Braden and Gamble surely provided excellent examples of successful plantation agriculture on the Manatee, the army
hardly reports anything on their efforts. The

life on the frontier may have dulled their
senses to the potential greatness that lay
ahead for the Manatee River so preoccupied
were they with just trying to survive in the
new environment we know as the Manatee
frontier.
9
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